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Red colobus monkeys (Colobus badius) are an important and desirable source of protein for chimpanzees (Pan troglo-
dytes; Goodall, 1986). A monkey kill attracts beggars that si-
dle up to the carcass owner, extend their hands, vocalize, and 
sometimes grab a scrap of meat. In some situations, the carcass 
owner may share with the beggar, breaking off a piece of meat 
and handing it to a beggar. Why would the owner give away 
food that it could consume? 
Food sharing, defined here as joint use of a monopolizable 
food source, can be as active as this chimpanzee example or as 
passive as a lioness allowing another lioness to feed on her ga-
zelle carcass. Either way, sharing appears to exemplify animal 
altruism because one individual accepts a fitness cost while 
another receives a fitness benefit. Although sharing may be al-
truistic at the time of the sharing event, mechanisms such as 
kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 
1971) may provide indirect or delayed benefits to the sharer 
(de Waal, 1989; Mitani and Watts, 2001; Perry and Rose, 1994). 
In the case of reciprocal altruism, the food is recouped in the 
future; thereby making sharing altruistic in the short term but 
selfish in the long term. The complicated cognitive machinery 
necessary for reciprocal altruism and the presence of relatives 
necessary for kin selection make these explanations limited in 
the contexts in which they apply. If, however, sharing leads to 
an immediate gain for the owner, the situation becomes much 
more general, and the more complex, long-term accounts are 
unnecessary. Applying resource defense theory (Brown, 1964; 
Ydenberg et al., 1986) to our general concept of sharing al-
lows us to consider unexplored explanations of sharing: non-
food owners may harass or interfere with the owner’s feeding, 
thereby making it uneconomical to defend the food. 
In our chimpanzee example, a beggar may harass the 
owner for food by screaming, grabbing at the carcass, or steal-
ing the entire carcass. Often the owner defends its carcass, 
thus risking injury and incurring energetic costs, opportunity 
costs of slowing feeding rate, and other costs such as attract-
ing more beggars. The beggar faces similar but probably re-
duced costs of its own when harassing. Therefore, the beg-
gar can influence the net payoffs to the owner by inflicting or 
withholding the costs of harassment. If the costs of harassment 
are large, sharing might yield a higher net benefit to the owner 
than defending. If the beggar alters the owner’s net benefits 
enough to change the owner’s optimal strategy, the beggar 
has manipulated the payoffs in a way that makes sharing in 
the owner’s immediate self-interest (i.e., sharing becomes mu-
tualistic). This manipulative mutualism may occur commonly 
in situations in which an actor’s behavior manipulates the net 
payoffs for another individual’s cooperative behavior, making 
cooperation mutualistic rather than altruistic. 
Harassment is a particularly interesting factor that may in-
fluence sharing across many situations and taxa because the 
beggar’s actions rather than extrinsic forces (such as patch 
profitability or travel time) determine the owner’s payoffs and 
optimal decision. To analyze the effect of harassment on food 
sharing explicitly, we consider an asymmetric game theoret-
ical model. This model is one of only a few models of food 
sharing and, more important, one of the first to analyze the po-
tential immediate fitness benefits associated with food sharing. 
This model examines the circumstances under which harass-
ment and sharing should occur as well as optimal amounts of 
harassment and sharing. 
Model
Elements of the sharing/harassment game
Consider two animals: a resource owner, who possesses a 
valuable food item of size A (for amount), and a beggar, who 
has nothing but is aware of the owner’s food item. Both in-
dividuals may forage elsewhere, but this food item offers a 
much more valuable fitness benefit per unit time. The owner 
may choose to share a portion of its food, say As (for amount 
shared). The beggar can choose to harass the owner or leave 
him alone. We express the beggar’s harassment intensity as a 
rate, c (e.g., measured in calories per second). If the beggar ha-
rasses the owner for time t, this costs the beggar ct, and it costs 
the owner γ∙ ct (where γ represents a conversion factor that 
captures how the beggar’s harassment affects the owner). We 
assume that the beggar harasses at intensity c when it is not 
busy eating; that is, while the beggar consumes shared food, it 
does not or cannot harass. 
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Consumption and time available for harassment. We base our 
model on time in the sense that we calculate the costs and ben-
efits in terms of the time engaged in various activities and cor-
responding rates of expenditure during these activities. We 
assume that both players consume food at rate r, so a single 
animal consuming the entire resource (amount A) will spend 
time A/r eating. Next, we express the time available for harass-
ment (Th) in the form 
(1) 
where p represents the proportion of A that the owner shares 
(i.e., p = As/A). The function π(p) gives the proportion of the 
maximum consumption time (A/r) that is available for harass-
ment. If the owner shares nothing, the beggar has the entire 
time available for harassment, so we expect that π(0) = 1. Sim-
ilarly, if the owner gave everything away, the beggar would 
have no time available to harass, so we expect that π(1) = 0. 
More generally, we expect that the time available for harass-
ment will decrease as the proportion shared increases. 
In this game, then, the owner influences the cost and dura-
tion of harassment by controlling As, while the beggar influ-
ences the cost of harassment by controlling the harassment in-
tensity c. 
The simplest game
Using these assumptions, we can write down the benefits to 
the owner (Bo) as a function of the proportion of A shared (de-
noted by p) and intensity of harassment c: 
(2) 
The benefits obtained by the beggar, Bb, also depend on the 
proportion shared and the intensity of harassment: 
(3) 
In the next step in finding a solution to the game, we ask how 
the owner’s choice of p affects the beggar’s optimal c and 
vice-versa. 
No share/no harass. The simple structure of Bb(p, c) leads us 
to a simple conclusion. “ No sharing” (p = 0) and “no harass-
ment” (c = 0) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game as cur-
rently constituted (a strong Nash equilibrium is equivalent 
to an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS; Maynard Smith, 
1982). The beggar’s benefits can only decrease with increasing 
harassment intensity (dBb/dc = π (p)/r), meaning that c = 0 is the 
beggar’s best option regardless of the owner’s behavior. A non-
zero harassment intensity cannot persist because, according to 
Equation 3, a beggar that reduces its harassment intensity al-
ways increases the benefits it obtains. In turn, this means that 
p = 0 represents the owner’s best choice because Bo(p, 0) = A(1 
– p) can only decrease with increasing p. This result may seem 
disappointing because no sharing and no harassment make for 
an uneventful interaction. We believe, however, that it reflects 
a common natural situation: when an owner possesses a com-
pletely defendable resource, a harasser only incurs costs by 
harassing, and it only benefits by recognizing the possessor’s 
ownership and moving on to some other possibility. 
Noncontingent benefits of harassment
This situation can change if harassment has some direct ben-
efits that accrue even if the owner does not share. A harasser 
may, for example, collect scraps, cause a distracted owner to 
spill, or actively steal parts of the resource. We call these gains 
the “noncontingent benefits” of harassment because they do 
not depend on the owner’s sharing. 
Modeling noncontingent benefits. We suppose that these non-
contingent benefits should increase with the intensity of ha-
rassment, c, and with the time available for harassment, (A/r)
π(p). With these in mind, we can rewrite our benefit functions 
as 
(4) 
for the owner, and 
(5)
 
for the beggar, where k represents a factor that measures the 
noncontingent benefits of harassment. We assume that the 
noncontingent benefits depend on the intensity of harass-
ment (more harassment yields more benefits); thus k is pro-
portional to c. Notice that we subtract the noncontingent gains 
from the owner’s benefits because we assume that any bene-
fit that the beggar derives from resource (A) comes at the own-
er’s expense. 
A noncontingent benefit factor k can destabilize the no 
share/no harass equilibrium by making harassment worth-
while in its own right. Generally speaking, if k > 1, the beggar 
can benefit from harassment regardless of the owner’s behav-
ior, and the beggar’s optimal harassment level (ĉ) should be the 
maximum intensity, say c*. If, however, k < 1, the beggar should 
not harass, and no share/no harass is the only equilibrium. 
The owner’s problem and the π(p) function
We expect that the beggar should either not harass (ĉ = 0) or 
harass at the maximal intensity (ĉ = c*). To study whether the 
owner should share when harassed, and if so, how much, we 
need to know more about the function π (p) that specifies the 
proportion of the maximum consumption time available for 
harassment. In the Appendix we derive a π(p) function using 
a stochastic model of the sharing process. This model assumes 
that the resource is subdivided into n discrete pieces, with the 
owner deciding whether to share each chunk with probability 
p. Notice that this subtle reinterpretation of p means that we 
should think of p as the average proportion shared, rather than 
the realized proportion shared—technically, we now have Ap 
= E(As), instead of Ap = As. If the resource is not divisible (n = 
1), π (p) decreases linearly with p with a slope of –1[π′(p) = –1; 
Figure 1]. For divisible resources (n > 1), the π (p) function has 
a slope of –2 at p = 0, increases in slope around p =.5, and has a 
slope of 0 at p = 1 (Figure 1). Regardless of divisibility, π(p) al-
ways decreases with p. 
Optimal sharing when harassed. With the basic properties of 
π (p) in hand, we can now show how harassment should affect 
the owner’s willingness to share (p). To begin, we differentiate 
the owner’s benefit function (Equation 4): 
(6) 
For indivisible resources (n = 1), π′(p) = –1, and 
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(7) 
We predict, therefore, that the owner should defend an in-
divisible resource (set p = 0) when 
and abandon it (set p = 1) when 
The dimensionless term r/c(γ + k) plays an important role 
in our model. The numerator includes the food consumption 
rate, and the denominator expresses the rate at which costs 
accrue during harassment. It represents, therefore, an effi-
ciency—a quotient of rate of benefit gain over rate of cost ac-
crual, and we call it the “ efficiency of consumption when ha-
rassed” (ECH). 
A divisible resource, however, complicates the analysis. Be-
cause π′ (0) = -2, we know that the owner maximizes its bene-
fits at p = 0 (no sharing) when 
or                        (8) 
(9) 
That is, the owner should share a divisible resource only 
when the ECH is < 2. 
Optimal amount to share. If 2 > r/c(γ + k) ≥ 0, then we expect 
the owner to share some portion of a divisible resource (Fig-
ure 2). Although the complexity of π (p) prevents a general al-
gebraic specification of the optimal p (or pˆ), a graphical method 
gives a relatively complete characterization. The pˆ  value is the 
solution of 
(10) 
Because π′ (p) is an increasing sigmoid function of p, –π′ (p) 
is a sigmoid function that decreases from 2 at p = 0 to 0 at p 
= 1. Figure 3 shows how pˆ  is related to the term r/c(γ + k). To 
find pˆ  corresponding to a given r/c(γ + k), we locate r/c(γ + k) 
on the vertical axis and trace a horizontal line to the sigmoid 
–π(p) curve, then we trace a vertical line to p axis to the find pˆ. 
This graphical solution gives a relatively complete picture of 
the economics of sharing: (1) pˆ  increases as r/c(γ + k) decreases; 
(2) if r/c(γ + k) ≥ 2, pˆ  = 0; (3) if 2 > r/c(γ + k) ≥ 1 then .5 ≥ pˆ > 0; (4) 
if 1 > r/c(γ + k) ≥ 0 then 1 ≥ pˆ > .5. 
In addition, this graphical solution shows the effect of re-
source divisibility. For a more divisible resource (higher n), the 
sigmoid function will be more abrupt and steplike (Figure 3B), 
shifting optimal sharing proportions closer to one-half. 
Assembling the pieces. Now that we have a reasonably com-
plete picture of the owner’s and beggar’s options, we assem-
ble these pieces into a game theoretical analysis. The simple 
form of the beggar’s problem makes this job easier because we 
only have to consider ĉ = 0 and ĉ = c* (where c* is the maximal 
intensity). This simplifies things because we only need to con-
sider two possibilities for the owner as well: the best reply to 
zero harassment and the best reply to maximal harassment. As 
discussed above, the owner’s best reply to no harassment is no 
sharing (pˆ = 0). We denote the best reply to maximal harass-
ment as p* and remark that this is given by: 
if                                                       (11)
 
otherwise.             (12) 
Since we have two alternatives for each player (ĉ = 0 or ĉ = 
c* for the beggar and pˆ = 0 or pˆ = p* ≠ 0 for the owner), we can 
gain some intuition about the game using the familiar tool of 
the two-by-two game matrix, as shown in Figure 4. 
We can now characterize all possible Nash equilibria (share/
no harass is never an equilibrium; Figure 5): 
1. No share/no harass. If k < 1, the noncontingent benefits of 
harassment are too small, so the beggar should not ha-
rass, and as a consequence the owner should not share. 
Figure 1. The proportion of time available to harass always decreases 
with the proportion shared. In the simplest case (Equation A1), the 
time available to harass decreases linearly to zero as the owner shares 
up to half of the resource, and if the owner shares more than half of 
the resource, the beggar never has the opportunity to harass (thick 
line). By incorporating resource divisibility or n (equation A2), we 
smooth the “kinked” property of the function (all other lines). Increas-
ing divisibility (n) approaches the simpler kinked function. 
Figure 2. To determine the optimal proportion to share, we maximize 
the owner’s benefit (Bo) as a function of proportion shared (p). If this 
maximum is ≤ 0 (negative derivative at p = 0), the owner should not 
share (pˆ1 = 0). If this maximum is > 0, the owner should share an inter-
mediate amount (pˆ 2 > 0; Equation 10). 
396 Stev en S & Step h en S i n Beh a vi o r a l ec ol og y 13 (2002) 
2. No share/harass. If k > 1 and r/c* (γ + k) ≥ 2, noncontingent 
benefits make harassment worthwhile for the beggar, but 
sharing does not benefit the owner because of the high 
ECH. That is, harassment has little effect on the owner’s 
consumption rate. 
3. Share/harass. If k > 1 and r/c* (γ + k) < 2, again, noncontin-
gent benefits make harassment worthwhile for the beg-
gar, but now sharing benefits the owner because of high 
costs of harassment relative to the rate of food consump-
tion (low ECH). 
Model discussion and conclusions
Now we review and highlight several key features and 
variables of the model. First, notice that adopting the maxi-
mum harassment intensity, c*, does not necessarily mean that 
the beggar will spend much time harassing the owner. Our 
model assumes that beggars harass only when not consum-
ing shared food. Considering the three equilibria listed above, 
then, we would expect the most harassment in the no share/
harass case, the least harassment in the no share/no harass 
case, and an intermediate amount in the share/harass case. 
The parameter k measures the noncontingent benefits of 
harassment and is probably the most important variable in 
the model. The condition k > 1 simply means that the bene-
fits of harassment must outweigh the costs even if the owner 
does not share. An animal that harasses when k < 1 simply 
burns its own resources (and an owner’s best strategy is to 
let the harasser do so). Our model’s second key parameter, 
the efficiency of consumption when harassed, or ECH [r/c* (γ 
+ k)], measures the speed of food intake relative to the cost 
rate of harassment. The role of intake rate (r) agrees with in-
Figure 3. With low resource divisibility (A), the optimal proportion to 
share (pˆ ) is relatively low for a given efficiency of consumption when 
harassed (ECH). With high resource divisibility (B), pˆ  approaches one-
half for the same ECH. 
Figure 5. The three possible Nash equilibria depend on noncontingent 
benefits (k) and feeding rate (r). 
Figure 4. Two-by-two game matrix representing the harassment game.
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tuition, for we do not expect sharing of small or easily pro-
cessed resources. 
Given that the resource is divisible (n > 1), the amount of 
divisibility does not affect the equilibria outlined above, but 
it should affect the proportion shared when sharing occurs. 
Our model predicts that the amount shared should approach 
one-half as resource divisibility increases (Figure 3). One-half 
is special in our model because we assume that both players 
feed at the same rate. It follows that if the owner wants to eat 
the maximum amount in peace (keeping the beggar occupied 
while it eats), then a 50/50 split will achieve this goal. 
DISCUSSION
Our model explores the effects of harassment on food shar-
ing. For harassment to be profitable, the beggar must receive 
benefits for harassing (high k) whether or not the owner shares 
(e.g., gathering scraps, stealing small pieces). In the face of this 
harassment, an owner may share if harassment sufficiently re-
duces its feeding efficiency [r/c* (γ + k)]. 
Importance and implications
Harassment and manipulation
As one of the first models to explicitly examine immediate 
benefits of food sharing, we set the stage for more general or 
parsimonious explanations of sharing than kin selection and 
reciprocal altruism (de Waal, 1989; Perry and Rose, 1994). 
Clutton-Brock and Parker (1995) reviewed general forms of 
manipulation and punishment in animal societies, but only 
two studies provide evidence that harassment influences an-
imal sharing. First, Wrangham (1975) suggested that harass-
ment may play a large role in chimpanzee sharing of colobus 
monkey meat after kills. These kills often attracted beggars 
that vocalized, used begging hand gestures, and even attacked 
the owner (Goodall, 1986; Wrangham, 1975). If the owner 
shared part of the food, the recipient usually left, followed by 
a small band of beggars. Wrangham (1975) hypothesized that 
the owners “paid” the beggars with pieces of food to avoid ha-
rassment. More recent evidence indicates that chimpanzees 
that harass intensely receive more food than those that harass 
less intensely (Gilby IC, unpublished data). 
Hauser and Marler (Hauser, 1992; Hauser and Marler, 
1993) described an extreme example of harassment affecting 
food sharing. In experiments involving rhesus macaques (Ma-
caca mulatta), Hauser and colleagues provided food to individ-
ual monkeys that were out of view of other monkeys. They 
found that, when detected by others, monkeys that did not 
give food recruitment calls experienced more aggression than 
monkeys that called. Calling females consumed more food 
than silent females because silent females dropped food while 
being chased (Hauser, 1992). The increase in callers’ consump-
tion indicates that calling may be immediately mutualistic. 
Noncontingent benefits
Our model emphasizes benefits that beggars receive even if 
the owner defends the food; that is, the owner cannot unilat-
erally defend the entire food source, so harassing the owner 
to gather scraps or steal pieces of food may benefit the beggar. 
Without these incentives to remain close to the owner, harass-
ment is not profitable, and in the absence of harassment, the 
owner has no incentive to share. 
Kummer and Cords (1991) conducted experiments on cap-
tive long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis), varying non-
contingent benefits for non-food owners. They found that 
non-food owners tended to harass more (via stealing, steal-
ing attempts, and food manipulation) when the owner could 
not completely control the food than when it could control the 
food. Unfortunately, the authors did not present data on the 
non-food owner’s success rate for obtaining food. 
Resource divisibility
Our finding that resource divisibility does not affect the 
owner’s decision to share is a bit curious. Although it does not 
directly influence sharing, divisibility may indirectly influence 
the decision to share if it affects the noncontingent benefits of 
harassment. We did find, however, that divisibility determines 
the proportion of the food source that the owner should share 
if it does share: owners should share about one-half of highly 
divisible food. 
Consider a lioness consuming a freshly killed gazelle. A 
single lioness can defend an intact carcass, but when the car-
cass begins to disintegrate, the lioness may have difficulty de-
fending the entire carcass, and she may allow others to take 
small pieces. Elgar (1986) suggested that, upon discovery of a 
food source, house sparrows (Passer domesticus) sparrows gave 
“chirrup” calls, thereby attracting conspecifics and decreasing 
individual predation risk. Interestingly, the sparrows called 
more frequently after discovering a divisible food source than 
a solid source. Hauser et al. (1993) reported similar results 
with chimpanzees: individuals gave more food-associated 
calls when consuming a divided watermelon than when con-
suming an intact watermelon. Perhaps frequent sharing of a 
divisible food source is simply a question of sheer monopo-
lizability. Defending multiple food sources may prove much 
more difficult than defending a single source. 
Latent harassment
In natural situations in which owners defend food before 
sharing (such as in chimpanzees), harassment is obvious. In 
situations in which the owner shares immediately, however, 
blatant harassment may not appear even if the ever-present 
threat of harassment maintains the sharing. Of course, latent 
harassment may prove difficult to observe in nature, neces-
sitating empirical manipulations of sharing and potential for 
harassment. In a related vein, the overt harassment and food 
defense may be an information-gathering ritual for both the 
owner and beggar; each one gauging the other’s motivation 
and resolve (see Ydenberg et al., 1986, for applications of the 
war of attrition to resource defense). 
Related models
Although few models directly focus on the immediate ben-
efits of food sharing (but see Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Mes-
terton-Gibbons and Dugatkin, 1999), several classes of models 
lay the foundation for theoretically exploring the evolution of 
food sharing. 
Resource defense
Whereas the term “sharing” often evokes thoughts of one 
individual actively donating food to another, sharing can be 
much more generally defined in terms of two or more indi-
viduals consuming a resource that one can monopolize. This 
broader concept of sharing encompasses many instances of re-
source defense. Brown (1964) originally described the “ eco-
nomic defendability” of territory defense as the circumstances 
under which an individual should accept the costs involved 
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in defending a territory. Others have extended this work to 
the defense of food sources. Ydenberg et al. (1986) modeled 
the defense of food sources in a way relevant to this model by 
considering the effects of interference (analogous to our ha-
rassment) on foraging decisions. Their model predicted that 
interference will slow intake rate, thereby making defense un-
economical for individuals that are far from their home and 
for those with richer food patches in their home range. The 
combined effect of interference and the asymmetries in home-
range distance and richness may allow subordinate individu-
als to feed in patches with dominant individuals or even inter-
fere with and exclude dominant individuals from patches. 
Tolerated theft
Blurton Jones (1984, 1986, 1987) argued that an asymmetry 
of value based on satiety might be important in tolerated theft 
situations. Although the next morsel of food is not very impor-
tant to the sated owner, it may be very valuable to the hungry 
beggar. Because of this decrease in the marginal value of food 
during consumption, the owner should tolerate theft of food 
by the beggar. 
Although this idea provided a valuable foundation for mod-
eling food sharing, the important aspect of behavior in game 
theory is the relative value of an individual’s options, not the 
value difference between individuals. Blurton Jones men-
tioned that owners must weigh the costs of defending food, but 
never incorporated this idea into the model. Without this key 
inclusion, the analysis ignores strategy stability. Winterhal-
der (1996a, 1996b) continued the marginal analysis of tolerated 
theft, but still did not apply a game theoretical approach. 
Producer/scrounger games
Our model examines the conditions under which a non-food 
owner benefits by harassing an owner and an owner benefits by 
sharing with the beggar. The producer-scrounger game (Bar-
nard and Sibly, 1981; Vickery et al., 1991) addresses whether 
individuals specialize in either searching for food individually 
(producing) or avoiding costs of foraging by parasitizing the 
finds of the producers (scrounging); thereby assuming that ha-
rassing and sharing occur. Keep in mind, however, that individ-
uals can choose between the two strategies; that is, for any given 
foraging bout, an individual is either a producer or scrounger, 
but it can choose either strategy in a future bout. Giraldeau and 
colleagues have experimentally investigated theory-based pre-
dictions on the effects of dominance, resource divisibility, role 
specialization, patch departure time, and competition intensity 
in a producer-scrounger situation (Beauchamp and Giraldeau, 
1997; Giraldeau et al., 1990). 
Extensions
Destabilizing the no share/no harass equilibrium
In our model, harassment can only persist when harassing 
produces noncontingent benefits for the harasser, and this re-
sult has led us to hypothesize that phenomena such as stealing 
and scrap collecting are prerequisites to harassment-induced 
sharing. We do not, of course, claim that this is the only way 
to destabilize the no share/no harass equilibrium, but it does 
seem to be a plausible and parsimonious approach. This result 
arises in our model because we assume that the beggar’s gains 
change linearly with harassment intensity, so that the optimal 
harassment intensity must be either the minimum level (0) or 
the maximum level (c*). Future work, ideally guided by empir-
ical results, might explore nonlinear benefit functions which 
can (in theory) destabilize the no share/no harass equilibrium 
without noncontingent benefits. 
Food consumption rate
Food consumption rate (r) is an important parameter in 
our model. We assume that the players have similar consump-
tion rates, which means that the amount required to keep a ha-
rasser busy is similar to the amount the owner will be able to 
eat in peace. In natural situations, consumption rates may be 
quite different because of differences in sex, age, or levels of 
satiety. Systematic variation in individual consumption rates 
may provide an interesting avenue to explore both theoreti-
cally and empirically. An informal application of our model’s 
logic suggests that differential consumption rates may influ-
ence the beggar’s decision to harass and the owner’s decision 
to share and how much to share. For example, owners may 
be more willing to share with slow eaters (e.g., juveniles who 
have not learned efficient food handling techniques) because 
they can be kept busy at minimal cost. 
N-player game
Our model considers only two players to simplify the prob-
lem and to conform to a standard two-by-two game matrix. In 
natural situations, however, multiple beggars often surround 
an owner. We speculate that including multiple beggars in our 
model will increase the overall intensity of harassment, thereby 
forcing the owner to share more frequently (any parent knows 
it is easier to tolerate harassment from one child than from sev-
eral children). Chapman and Kramer (1996) found experimen-
tally that as the number of food competitors increased, the own-
er’s intake rate decreased, guarding success decreased, and 
total number of chases peaked at intermediate competitor num-
bers. The difficulty in analyzing the effects of beggar number 
on sharing lies in how to distribute the food in such a way to 
minimize harassment costs when facing multiple beggars. Fur-
ther analysis is necessary to explore optimal amounts of food 
that an owner should share with multiple beggars: should the 
owner share one large piece to draw some of the beggars away, 
or should it share small pieces with every beggar? 
The optimal strategy of the beggars offers a challenge as 
well. One can imagine multiple beggars in a situation similar 
to that of a group of vigilant prey. Like the concept of corpo-
rate vigilance (Bertram, 1980), a beggar would probably ben-
efit more from having additional beggars around to increase 
chances of sharing. Packer and Abrams (1990) modeled vigi-
lance situations and found that Nash equilibrium vigilance 
levels were often lower than Pareto equilibrium (or co-oper-
ative optimum) vigilance levels. Similarly, food beggars are 
tempted to cheat or not harass by relying on harassment by 
others, thereby avoiding their own costs of harassment. 
Summary
Using a game theoretical approach, we modeled the effects 
of harassment on food sharing. Our model predicts that a non-
food owner should harass an owner when the nonowner can 
gain benefits even in the absence of sharing. These non-con-
tingent benefits (such as gathering dropped scraps) can re-
coup energetic costs of harassing. An owner should only share 
when a beggar harasses, significantly reducing its consump-
tion rate. Therefore, if an owner consumes the food slowly, a 
beggar can harass for long periods of time, so the owner pays 
high costs of defending. Experimentally manipulating param-
eters such as feeding rate, noncontingent benefits, resource di-
visibility, and number of beggars in a sharing context could 
provide rigorous tests of our model. 
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APPENDIX
The π(p) function and time available for harassment 
Here we determine how the amount shared, As, influences the 
time available for harassment. Because we assume that both 
players feed at rate r, the owner consumes for time 
while the beggar consumes for time 
The difference 
represents the time available for harassment, with the pro-
viso that a negative value means zero time available for ha-
rassment (because the beggar spends longer eating than the 
owner). If we let Th represent the time available for harass-
ment, then we have 
                                                             if
                                                                 otherwise
Substituting this into Equation 1 suggests a π(p) function of 
the form 
                                                                if
(A1) 
                                                                 otherwise
so that Th = (A/r)π(p) as required. Figure 1 uses Equation A1 
to plot π(p) as a function of the proportion shared p. Although 
one might construct a model based on the “kinked” π (p) func-
tion (Figure 1) discussed above, it is both inconvenient and im-
plausible. It is inconvenient because the discontinuity at p = .5 
means that all remaining calculations must also take account 
of this condition. It is implausible because stochastic variation 
in consumption rates (r) and the amount shared (As) will com-
bine to create smooth expected harassment time curve [E(Th)]. 
The next few paragraphs discuss one simple way to incorpo-
rate this stochasticity. 
Resource divisibility and binomial sharing
Some resources divide easily into parts, whereas others can-
not. Suppose that the resource in question can be divided into 
n equal parts of size A/n. Now suppose that when the owner 
chooses the proportion to share, p, it determines the probabil-
ity of sharing each part. In this scenario the number of parts 
shared is a random variable drawn from a binomial distribu-
tion with parameters p and n, where p represents the owner’s 
willingness to share (p = As/A), and the n represents the divisi-
bility of the resource. 
The assumption that a binomial process governs sharing al-
lows us to specify completely the expected time available for 
harassment given the owner’s willingness to share, p. If the 
owner shares m of the n parts, the owner retains amount 
and the beggar obtains amount 
Because we assume that both animals feed at the same rate 
(r), the time available for harassment is the difference 
as long as n – 2m is positive. If not, the beggar has more food 
than the owner, and it will continue eating even after the 
owner has finished. So there is no time available for harass-
ment (Th = 0) if m ≥ n/2. To find the expected time available 
for harassment [E(Th)], we calculate the product of the time 
available (Th) and the probability of m pieces being shared, 
summed over every possible m. We use 
as the binomial probability of sharing m pieces (Zar, 1996). 
(A2) 
where the indicated portion of this expression is the π(p) func-
tion that we seek. Figure 1 shows this π(p) function for a range 
of resource divisibilities (n values). The figure compares this 
family of π(p) functions to the piecewise function (Equation 
A1) obtained when we assume infinite divisibility and error-
free sharing. For indivisible resources (n = 1), π(p) is a straight 
line [π(p) = 1 – p; Figure 1]. As resource divisibility increases, 
π(p) approaches the piecewise function derived earlier (Equa-
tion A1; see Figure 1). 
Although we cannot express π(p) in an algebraically conve-
nient closed form, we can easily state the important properties 
of π(p). The most important feature of π(p) is its derivative at 
zero [π′ (0)]. Direct differentiation shows 
                                                   if
if                                            (A3) 
    
that is, the derivative at zero is –1 for indivisible resources and 
–2 otherwise. Moreover, for divisible resources, the derivative 
at p = 1 is zero [π′ (1) = 0]. In the indivisible case, π(p) = 1 – p, so 
π′ (p) = –1 for all p. Finally, we observe that π(p) decreases with 
p (technically, it is nonincreasing with p). 
Index of variables
A entire resource amount
As amount owner shares with beggar
Bb fitness benefits received by beggar
Bo fitness benefits received by owner
c intensity of harassment
c* maximum intensity of harassment
ĉ optimal intensity of harassment
ECH efficiency of consumption when harassed
k noncontingent benefits factor
m number of discrete parts of resource shared by owner
n total number of discrete parts of resource
p proportion of total amount shared
p* proportion of total amount shared that is optimal reply to c*
pˆ  optimal proportion of total amount shared
r consumption rate
t total harassment time
Th time available for harassment
γ effect of beggar’s harassment intensity on owner’s fitness
π(p) proportion of maximum consumption time that is available 
for harassment when owner shares p proportion of food
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